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US POLICY CONCERNING ISREAL'S  
SURVIVAL IN VIEW OF THE ENERGY  
CRISIS

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the US-Arab relationship in the Middle East. This presentation deals with US's special relationship to Israel since her creation in 1948; Israel's contributions to US security in the Middle East, Israel's requirements from the US for her survival; and future US policy concerning support for Israel. Because of the present "energy crisis", analysts find a perplexing problem facing the US's relation to Israel. Some analysts claim that the "energy crisis" is really an "energy problem" used by the oil industry to boost oil			

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prices; that the US has sufficient fuel resources to last several hundred years; and that the US must begin creating alternatives to the energy problem. The research method used for this essay included interviews with specialists in Arab - Israeli affairs and from current data of US - Israeli relations.

US policy towards Israel should rest on the propositions of negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 242; maintain a military balance of power between Israel and the Arab states which offers the least chance of success to parties that are tempted to solve conflicts by military means; maintain a balance of power contingent upon the deterrence of direct intervention of the Sixth Fleet to preserve Middle East stability and discourage USSR aggression; support repatriation, restitution, and resettlement of the Arab refugees; and uphold a unified Jerusalem under Israel's administration with special arrangements made for the sacred Jewish, Christian, and Islamic areas.

USAWC RESEARCH ELEMENT  
(Essay)

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US POLICY CONCERNING ISRAEL'S SURVIVAL  
IN VIEW OF THE ENERGY CRISIS

by

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US Army War College  
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  
18 August 1973

### PRESSURE ON THE U.S. CONCERNING THE "ENERGY CRISIS"

With the increasing dependence of the U.S. on imported oil from the Middle East, American foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly towards Israel, will need to be reexamined. Until alternative sources of energy are practical, there will be constant pressure on the U.S. from the Arab countries as well as the U.S. oil importers to withdraw support from Israel and develop closer political ties with the Arab countries. "Saudi Arabia - the largest Mideast supplier of oil to the U.S. - has warned the U.S. that it will not expand its oil production unless Washington changes its pro-Israel stance".<sup>1</sup> Libya's president, Colonel Qadhafi, took a more daring step and nationalized the Nelson Bunker Hunt Oil Company, a U.S. oil company earning 140 million dollars annually, and called for "the beginning of a battle against American interests in the whole Arab region".<sup>2</sup> There is also a fear that Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, and other 'radical' Arab states will press the governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to join them in nationalizing oil as a means of forcing the U.S. to abandon its military, economic, and political support for Israel.

During June 1972, Mohammed Hassanein Heykal, editor of Cairo's AL AHRAM, urged Sadat to execute "a new strategical conception based upon husbanding all Arab resources, particularly oil, and withholding them from the U.S. until she pressures Israel to evacuate the Arab territories".<sup>3</sup> Thereafter, presidential advisor Henry Kissinger met twice with the ambassador to Israel, and

discussed with him the possibilities of persuading Israel to adopt a more 'flexible' stance for an accord with the Arab countries, particularly the United Arab Republic. It is precisely this shift of power towards the Arab oil producers that may force the U.S. to reappraise her policy towards Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

For the last 10 months, the U.S. has been exposed to the threat of the "energy crisis". Whether or not there is actually an energy crisis, the widespread public feeling of an energy crisis creates sufficient pressures on the U.S. policy for the Middle East to cause its reevaluation. State Secretary Rogers recently spoke on the "energy crisis" and said, "We, of course, and certainly not for reasons of oil alone, seek good relations with the Arab countries ... with the Palestinians, the other Arabs, and the Israelis alike".<sup>4</sup> Seeking "good relations" with the Arab countries certainly needs to be reemphasized, especially due to the present "energy crisis" that has gripped parts of the United States.

There are those who claim that in reality, there is no energy crisis, but rather an institutional crisis. On 17 July 1973, the Federal Trade Commission indicted "eight largest US oil companies of monopolistic refining and marketing practices that have ... contributed to the gasoline shortage".<sup>5</sup> William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, warned that the more the US becomes dependent upon foreign sources for oil, the more the US courts disaster. "We have to take steps to reduce our vulnerability ... we couldn't let ourselves be politically hostage to those who would turn off the tap".<sup>6</sup> The real crisis then is not

the oil shortage but a dependence on Arab oil which will be worrisome to the US for several reasons: the uncertainty of the continuous flow arising out of political instability of the source countries; the international political implications of a number of Third World countries; the balance-of-payment problem it causes; and the increased environmental dangers inherent in the overseas transport of evergrowing quantities of oil. Therefore, the so-called "energy crisis" facing the US in actuality, transcends the Arab-Israeli conflict.

For the next 10 or 15 years, the US should adopt the following creative courses of action concerning energy requirements: first, take action to stimulate and accelerate the development of indigenous energy resources; second, initiate strong programs to eliminate waste in the consumption of energy through energy conservation; third, further increase US energy pricing policies for natural gas; fourth, encourage the development of synthetic fuels; and finally, reduce excessive ecological regulations that prevent construction of energy producing facilities.

For the long-term standpoint, the US energy position is basically sound, wherein the US possesses large potential resources of crude oil, natural gas, coal, uranium, shale oil, and geothermal energy.

More than half of the world's total reserves of coal are located within the United States ... enough to provide our energy needs for well over a century. We have a potential resource of billions of barrels of recoverable oil, similar quantities of shale oil and more than 2,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas ... these supplies can last

for as long as our economy depends on conventional fuels ... We can draw upon hydroelectric plants and increasing numbers of nuclear-powered facilities. Thus we should not be misled into pessimistic predictions of an energy crisis.<sup>7</sup>

It may be certain that by the year 2000, the US should be receiving sufficient solar, nuclear, and geothermal energy to forget that an "energy crisis" ever existed. But until then, plans for action must be made to insure that the US will have sufficient energy resources and be free to pursue an even-handed policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

US policy towards Israel in the Arab-Israel Conflict began on 29 November 1947, when the U.S. voted for the U.N.'s plan for partitioning Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state, and gave de facto recognition to the State of Israel. Following the Armistice Agreement of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the U.S. formulated a Middle East policy dedicated to the termination of the Arab-Israeli dispute through peaceful negotiations. Two years later, 25 May 1950, the "Tripartite Declaration" was signed by the U.S., France, and England, in which they declared their "desire to promote the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability in the area".<sup>8</sup> The declaration also opposed the Arab-Israeli arms race, and insured each country's future safety from Communist aggression and internal security.

During the 1950s, due to the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict and the inter-Arab disputes, the USSR increased her interest in the Middle East by offering military and economic assistance



coupled with technical 'know how' to Egypt and thereafter to Iraq, Yemen, and Algeria. At the time of the Suez conflict of 1956, the USSR was committed to supporting Egypt and even threatened to intervene if France, England, and Israel refused to evacuate the Suez-Sinai region. As a result of this, President Eisenhower issued the "Eisenhower Doctrine" which provided for military assistance to nations of the Middle East dedicated to the maintenance of national independence; authorized the use of military forces in support of states requesting assistance against Communist control; and provided economic aid to the developing countries.<sup>9</sup>

In the fall of 1962, the U.S. decided to supply the Hawk missile system to Israel. The reason given for U.S. military assistance to Israel was in order to reinstate the balance of power which was offset by the USSR in favor of the Arab countries. The U.S. was apprehensive that the arms imbalance caused by the USSR would encourage an all-out Arab attack on Israel.<sup>10</sup> On 3 April 1963 President Kennedy reemphasized that U.S. policy for the Middle East was to limit the arms race, maintain a military balance which will discourage military action on either side, and strive for political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the region.<sup>11</sup> U.S. military and economic assistance therefore continued to flow to Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon on the basis of continuing the arms balance, protecting friendly Arab states from Arab 'radical' states, and preventing communism from making further inroads in the Middle East. The

U.S. also viewed her military and economic assistance policy as a 'tool' which might eventually achieve conditions conducive to a rapprochement between Israel and her Arab neighbors.

In the mid-1960's the USSR further increased her military assistance to Egypt and Syria and thereby fully committed herself to support her Arab clients in their struggle for victory over Israel. The U.S. felt that these conflicts of interest could erupt into open hostilities which would lead to WW III. From then until the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, U.S. policy was to continue striving for an Arab-Israeli peace, create political stability, and render military and economic assistance to friendly Arab countries and Israel.

At the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, President Johnson on 19 June 1967 further defined U.S. policy for the Middle East, setting forth five principles for peace in the region:<sup>12</sup>

1. The fundamental right of every nation to live in the area and to have that right respected by its neighbors;
2. Justice for the refugees;
3. Respect for international maritime rights for all nations;
4. Limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
5. Respect for the political independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area.

Within these guidelines, the U.S. supported the U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, which affirmed the following basis for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East:<sup>13</sup>

1. Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied;
2. Respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
3. Freedom of navigation through international waterways;
4. Just settlement of the refugee problem; and
5. Guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence through measures of demilitarized zones.

In 1969, President Nixon decided on a new approach by making use of the four-power talks - the U.S., USSR, France, and England - for purposes of achieving an Arab-Israeli peace. This new initiative on the part of the U.S. was undertaken at the time the Arab-Israeli conflict was becoming very explosive and needed defusing, especially because of the USSR's active participation in Egypt with 15,000 military personnel and the latest weapons. "I consider it a powder keg, very explosive ... because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid."<sup>14</sup> At the same time, the Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, offered a plan for an Arab-Israeli peace which was rejected by Israel because it was asking her to withdraw to her former territories without offering her "secure and recognized boundaries".

Following the Israeli rejection, the U.S. launched a diplomatic campaign for a cease-fire, based on the U.N. Security Council

Resolution 242 and provided for:<sup>15</sup>

1. A cease fire;
2. Negotiations under U.N.'s envoy, Dr. Gunnar Jarring;
3. Israel's acceptance to fulfill the resolution; and
4. A commitment by Egypt and Jordan to the principle of peace with Israel and the acknowledgement of her right to exist within secure and recognized borders, in return for an Israeli commitment of withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict. (It is important to note that the word 'all' in speaking of an Israeli withdrawal was omitted intentionally as it was in U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.)

The U.S.'s intention for the August 1970 cease-fire along the Suez Canal was to encourage Israel, Egypt, and Jordan to "stop shooting and start talking" under U.N. auspices. But unfortunately as of this day, no real progress has been made for an Arab-Israeli negotiated peace, directly or indirectly, or even for reopening of the Suez Canal, thereby bringing about a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops in Sinai. Thus the Arab-Israeli conflict remains as potentially explosive as in the past, with the exception of the USSR and the U.S. agreeing during their summit meeting of June 1972 to decrease the risk of a military confrontation in the Middle East. The danger of a U.S.-USSR conflict was further reduced by Sadat's expulsion of most of the Soviet military personnel in Egypt. For the 1970's it may be said that the U.S. policy for the Arab-Israeli conflict will remain that of limiting the arms race, maintaining a military balance, sustaining the

cease - fire, and actively supporting the UN Security Council Resolution 242, calling for an Arab - Israeli peace.

ISRAEL'S CONTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES SECURITY IN MIDDLE EAST

Israel, a stable democracy and ally of the US, is contributing to US defense in containing Communist expansion in the Middle East. The USSR aims to weaken the "soft underbelly of NATO", influence Arab countries to adopt 'radical' positions, and eventually expel US influence from the Middle East, and achieve a one sided 'peace' in the Arab - Israeli conflict through a political victory or through military pressure on Israel on behalf of her Arab clients. During March 1970, the USSR engaged in a progression of escalating military support for Egypt by installing SAM - III's "for defense purposes only", and having her pilots fly MIG 23's during combat missions.

General Haim Bar - Lev, Israel's chief of staff, said there were scores of Soviet pilots in Egypt flying frequently, whose aim was to enable Egypt with air defense...and thus spoil our chances of foiling the war of attrition.<sup>16</sup>

The USSR favors a state of controlled tension with a "no war and no peace" situation that she could exploit, knowing that genuine Arab - Israeli peace would terminate her usefulness to Egypt and Syria. Therefore, the major deterrents to USSR's expansion in the Middle East remains the might of the US Sixth Fleet and Israel's preparedness to defend occupied territories.<sup>17</sup>

Egypt offered the USSR exclusive bases at Mersa Matruh,

Alexandria and at various other installations as long as she felt that she would be fully supported in her conflict with Israel. However, in July 1972, when Egypt realized that Soviet forces would not actively intervene in a future Arab - Israeli war, she expelled them.<sup>18</sup> In the final analysis, it is the combination of US - Israeli military power that dissuaded the USSR from adventurism in a future Arab - Israeli war. Today, with the USSR's military presence in Egypt virtually gone, the danger of another Arab - Israeli war leading to a conflict between the nuclear powers in the Middle East has diminished considerably.

The USSR's involvement in the Middle East is also based on a policy of encouraging and assisting 'radical' Arab countries. Israel, aware of the USSR's intentions, acts as a balance of power and contributes to the stability of Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia from forcibly being overthrown and becoming 'leftist'. On 18 September 1970, Jordan was convulsed by a civil war between King Hussein's loyal forces and the Palestinian Liberation Army. Three days later, Syrian troops invaded Jordan and were 50 miles north of Amman. The US warned Syria of the dangers of the invasion and urged her to withdraw immediately. The US then alerted the 82d Airborne Division and combat units stationed in Germany, and sent elements of the Sixth Fleet towards Syria. "The Israeli attitude...has been that King Hussein was winning without outside help...and his army could score an overwhelming victory".<sup>19</sup> Had the Syrian forces not withdrawn from Jordan, Israeli military forces were prepared to join US forces and

intervene on the side of Jordan. It was during the recent Nixon - Brezhnev summit meeting that Henry Kissinger said,

"You have no idea how close we came to war because of the fighting in Jordan in 1970, when Syrian tank forces, advised by Soviet military men, crossed briefly into Jordan on the side of the Palestinians".<sup>20</sup>

We may assume from this remark that the US Sixth Fleet plus the Israeli forces influenced Syria in halting her invasion, thereby returning stability to Jordan's borders.

Similarly, on 4 May 1973, the Lebanese were faced with the specter of civil war, this time over the issue of Governmental control over the Palestinian guerrillas who used Lebanon as a base in their campaign against Israel. Three days later, 5,000 Palestinian guerrillas based in Syria crossed into Lebanon.

Syria threatened to invade Lebanon and accused her of:

Complicity in an anti-Palestinian conspiracy of foreign design, presumably an allusion to the US and Israel. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan warned ... that if the Syrian army entered Lebanon and endangered Israel's borders, the Israeli Government might feel obliged to act.<sup>21</sup>

Syria refrained from invading Lebanon. This again illustrates Israel's contribution as a stabilizing force in the Middle East. Israel is also a positive contributor to US interests by inhibiting the 'radical' Arab elements which pose a grave threat to the moderate Arab oil countries; encouraging an environment favorable to Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia; containing the USSR from further expansion; and protecting pipelines carrying great quantities of Saudi oil through the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. For these and other reasons, Secretary of State

Rogers said, "Our policy vis-a-vis Israel remains constant...We believe that the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Israel is very important for our national interest"<sup>22</sup>

#### ISRAEL'S REQUIREMENTS FROM THE UNITED STATES

During the years of 1955 to 1972, the USSR furnished 4 billion dollars worth of military aid to Arab states in the Middle East. In 1972, "new shipments of Soviet military equipment were concentrated in Syria, Iraq, and Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen."<sup>23</sup> The Soviet buildup of military equipment has steadily increased the Arab - Israeli arms race. The USSR's shipments of aircraft and armor for Egypt and Syria stands at 200 percent of the 1967 levels. Moreover, weapons lost or obsolete have been replaced by later and more sophisticated weapons in practically all categories (MIG 15's and 17's with SU-7's, MIG 19's, 21's and 23's; and T-34 tanks with T-54/55). They have also become deeply involved in building an air - defense system consisting of 12 to 15 SA-2 batteries plus 3 to 5 SA-3 batteries west of the Suez Canal. In 1970, Senator Jackson reported that:

there are in the air forces of Israel's hostile neighbors, some 600 supersonic aircraft, many times the number available in Israel. We know that there are some 1,000 surface-to-air missiles in Egypt. This system constitutes the most extensive air defense network ever deployed by a minor power.<sup>24</sup>

Israel estimates that in 1976, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq will have 1,500 planes including MIG-23's, Sukhoi fighter - bombers and Tupolev heavy - bombers equipped with Kelt air-to-surface missiles,



and 6,000 to 7,000 tanks including 400 advanced T-62's. With such a tremendous arsenal in the hands of Israel's enemies, Israel has steadily requested US military assistance to maintain her balance of power.

The initial US military assistance program with Hawk missiles for Israel began on 26 September 1962.<sup>25</sup> Following the June 1967 Arab - Israeli conflict, because of France's embargo on military equipment to Israel, the US became Israel's main military supplier, especially for "supersonic planes as may be necessary to provide Israel with an adequate deterrent force capable of preventing future Arab aggression."<sup>26</sup> Israel then began receiving the first of many shipments of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers and A-4 Skyhawk jet-fighters.

During the Egypt-Israeli truce period of August 1970, Egypt violated the truce agreement and deployed SA-2 and SA-3 missiles in the 30 mile truce zone. To again reestablish the military balance, the US provided Israel with Shrike air-to-surface missiles, Walleye aerial-bombs, additional F-4 Phantoms and A-4 Skyhawks, 180 M-60 main battle tanks and M-48 Patton tanks, and 175-mm and long range artillery. Also, because of the burden of Israel's defense budget, \$1.5 billion of a total \$3.8 billion national budget, the US provided "\$500 million in military credits as previously authorized in Public Law 91-411."<sup>27</sup>

On 15 November 1972, Israel requested assurance for a steady flow of F-4 Phantoms and A-4 Skyhawks, and pressed for such sophisticated missiles as the Lance and the Maverick, plus the

Cobra helicopter gunships.<sup>28</sup> On 13 March 1973, new US commitments were made to Israel whereby she was to receive 2 more squadrons each of F-4 Phantoms and of A-4 Skyhawks, giving her a total of about 150 F-4 Phantoms and 200 A-4 Skyhawks by the end of 1973. From 1967 to 1973, the US military assistance program to Israel was based upon a policy stressing the balance of arms, guaranteeing the 1970 cease-fire, and encouraging Arab - Israeli negotiations for peace.

In addition to needing military assistance, Israel required US political support in and out of the UN in implementing the Security Council Resolution 242, which gave Israel a "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries." Before June 1967, Israel was vulnerable by an attack from Jordan through the 15 mile Jerusalem - Tel Aviv corridor; Egypt was 12 minutes flying time from Tel Aviv and could block navigation to Eilat; and Syria was inflicting bombardments at will on settlements in the Galilee region. Israel seeks US support wherein "defensible and secure borders" probably mean establishing a demilitarized Sinai and securing Sharm El Sheik; occupying the Golan Heights; controlling Jerusalem except for the various religious sites; and demilitarizing the West Jordanian region.<sup>29</sup> During the UN Middle East debate of June 1973, Ambassador Scali supported Israel and said that:

The 1967 resolution is silent on the specific question of where the final borders should be located; it neither endorses nor precludes the armistice lines which existed between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on June 4, 1967, as

the final secured and recognized boundaries.<sup>30</sup>

Another vital need for Israel is the presence of the US Sixth Fleet as a deterrent to USSR intervention in future Arab - Israeli conflicts. A US military presence would also prevent a major shift in the balance of power and protect the US oil interest in the Middle East. The major reason for the USSR's inactivity during the June 1967 war was due to US sea-supremacy and Israel's air superiority. The US could continue to keep the Middle East calm with a Sixth Fleet force composed of 60 war ships, 2 aircraft carriers, 250 combat planes, and 4 missile carrying nuclear-powered submarines.<sup>31</sup>

Israel also requires substantial US economic aid because of her heavy defense budget. Since 1948, the US has extended to Israel more than \$1.2 billion in economic aid. This includes \$278 million in grants, \$235 million in development loans, \$126 million in agriculture commodities aid, and \$296 million in long-term Export-Import Bank loans.<sup>32</sup> On 12 December 1967, the US agreed to provide Israel and the Arab countries with a Nuclear Desalting Plant. Israel availed herself to this project and is beginning to show results through an increase of agricultural productivity in the Negev.<sup>33</sup> In 1972, the US contributed \$50 million and in 1973 \$62.5 million for financing excess agricultural commodities under Public Law 480, followed by an endowment of \$60 million towards establishing a Binational Science Foundation in Israel for technological research for peaceful purposes.<sup>34</sup> Israel requires these grants and loans to help support her economic

development, relieve her financial defense burden, and replace her foreign exchange resources which are drying up. Prime Minister Golda Meir recently said that US military assistance, political support, and economic aid are "the best guarantee not only for Israeli people but also the best guarantee for peace in the area."<sup>35</sup>

#### FUTURE US POLICY CONCERNING SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL

Genuine peace in the Middle East will depend upon the willingness of the Arabs and Israelis to negotiate the text of the UN Security Council Resolution 242, "avoiding the use or threat of force...and respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states."<sup>36</sup> On 18 June 1973, President Bourguiba of Tunisia, called for a settlement of the Arab - Israeli conflict through negotiations "based on a recognition of the rights of all in the area, among them the rights of Israel 'not to be exterminated and cast into the sea'."<sup>37</sup> The US has maintained close and friendly relations with Israel and with some of the Arab countries, especially with Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, wherein she has interests in their political independence and territorial integrity.

Future US support towards Israel should be based on UN Security Council Resolution 242, which seeks Israel's "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries." The US should not attempt to impose a settlement on Israel, nor should she spell out what the territorial, judicial, or demographic outcome of the agreements between the Arabs and Israelis

should be. The negotiations must remain free and untrammelled if they are to lead to a genuine peace. UN Resolution 242 presents generally agreed headings of the issues to be settled and all attempts to go into details, should be left to Arab - Israeli negotiations.

The US should also continue to support Israel's military needs and preserve the balance of power in the Middle East. This policy of providing Israel with military assistance, economic aid, and political support serves the US's foreign interests as well as Israel's in keeping peace and stability, as well as indirectly protecting US oil investments in the Middle East. Furthermore, the US should maintain an unequivocal policy of strength through the Sixth Fleet by deploying additional Polaris submarines and ships, thereby discouraging the USSR and 'radical' Arab states from interfering with future Arab - Israeli peace negotiations. Through such an arrangement of US military power, the Arabs and Israelis will be inclined to engage toward genuine negotiations and an eventual peace agreement.

One of the major problems at the heart of the Arab - Israeli conflict which was largely ignored by the UN's 1967 resolution is the Arab refugee problem. The US should support the efforts of the Arab refugees for genuine self-determination, including the right to establish a Palestinian Arab State embracing the West Bank and Gaza. "There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless."<sup>38</sup> Moreover, the US should urge

Arab states, especially those with financial means and ample territory, to take a responsible attitude towards those refugees in supporting and settling them within their borders.

Concerning the problem of Jerusalem, the US should urge Israel to surrender her jurisdiction over the holy places that are revered by Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The arrangements for control of these holy places should be made by Israel, Jordan, and the Vatican. The city of Jerusalem, however, should remain unified and administered by Israel, and open to "all faiths and nationalities. We (US) believe Jerusalem should be unified... within which there would no longer be restrictions on the movements of persons and goods."39

  
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